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The Role of Institutions, Islamism, and Militaries in the Outcomes of the Arab 
Spring: The Cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria 
Olivia Delmonico1 
 
Abstract. During the Arab Spring in 2011, much of the Middle Eastern world faced a 
series of uprisings demanding democracy and equality. Most of these attempts at 
revolution desperately failed, with some nations faring far worse than before. Some, 
however, remain more stable than others, with Tunisia being the sole full success. 
This article delves into the varying causes of the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. 
These countries respectively represent the good, the bad, and the ugly outcomes of 
the Arab Spring.  
 Through a thorough analysis of other literature on the subject, I conclude that 
the success of modern Arab revolutions depends entirely on three factors: 
institutional disposition, involvement of the military, and the role of Islamism. In 
understanding the importance of these factors, the international community can learn 
how to effectively react to situations similar to that of 2011 and perhaps prevent 
horrific atrocities like that of Syria.  
 
Introduction 
What is now known as the Arab Spring consisted of a series of revolutions in the 
Arab world beginning in 2010. Though reasons for these revolutions vary from 
country to country, protestors in most cases were seeking to implement democracy, 
equality, and a stronger and more inclusive economy. Both violent and nonviolent 
protests occurred in at least twenty different territories, with major uprisings 
occurring in six nations: Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. With the 
majority of conflict slowing by 2013, it appeared that most protests of the so-called 
Arab Spring resulted in revolutionary failure due to being repressed by violent and 
often deadly governmental authorities. Both the successes and the failures of the Arab 
Spring are represented by the conflict and results that occurred in three countries: 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. Respectively, these nations represent the good, the bad, 
and the ugly outcomes of the Arab Spring. In analyzing the rebellions and ensuing 
results of each country, it is clear that three factors are responsible for the 
achievements and deficiencies of each revolution: institutional disposition, use of 
military power, and role of Islamism. 
 This article will answer the question of why Tunisia succeeded, Egypt 
somewhat failed, and Syria failed entirely. Unlike other studies that separately 
                                               
1 I'd like to thank Professor Akbulut-Gok for her help with research and editing. Direct all 
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address the issues and results of individual countries, this study will analyze three 
very different nations and the consequences of their revolutions. Tunisia and Egypt 
are frequently compared because they are often-cited cases in the literature on the 
Arab Spring, but Syria is often disregarded as a disaster. Many see Syria as a lost 
cause and consequently ignore the factors that led to Syria being considered a failure. 
These factors, however, were at play in each country experiencing a revolution and, 
thus, knowledge of the involvement of these elements in a horrific situation like Syria 
is important to preventing another. This paper will delve into the components that 
contributed to Syria’s downfall, Egypt’s middle ground failure, and Tunisia’s success, 
including the roles of institutions, the military, and Islamism in each country. It will 
become apparent that the severity of each of these factors is responsible for the 
current situations occurring in the modern Arab world. In addressing these elements 
and their contributions toward the very different circumstances currently at play in 
the Middle East, the diplomatic community can begin a productive discussion on 
how to facilitate stability in these countries, as well as how to prevent atrocities from 
happening again.  
 
Revolutions, Institutions, and Democracy 
Tariq Ali defines “revolution” as “a transfer of power from one social class (or even 
a layer) to another that leads to fundamental change.”2 By this definition, failed 
attempts to overthrow a government are not considered revolutions. As a result, the 
events of the Arab Spring in Syria constitute a failed attempt at a revolution. This is 
because Bashar Al-Assad remains in power. Tunisia and Egypt experienced success 
in forcing their respective governments out of power.  
A revolution can be considered a failure when it does not result in the desired 
change that caused the revolution in the first place. This usually involves the 
overthrow of a government due to demand for democracy, followed by that 
government being replaced with a non-democratic regime. In explaining why 
revolutions often fail, Karl Fitzgerald writes, “Revolutions usually finish in 
confusion…because, after the smoke and confusion of battle, a hastily patched up 
government may have given little thought about what comes next.”3 He goes on to 
prove his point by criticizing the French Revolution of 1789, in which revolutionaries 
wished to break free from monarchy and end the mass control by the wealthy, land-
owning elite. However, not long after the end of the revolution, Napoleon declared 
himself emperor and the land-owning elite still amassed power. Fitzgerald writes that 
                                               
2 Tariq Ali, “What is a revolution?” Counterpunch, September 4, 2013, 
https://www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/04/what-is-a-revolution/. 
3 Karl Fitzgerald, “Do Revolutions Work?” Earthsharing, October 25, 2011.  
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the French could have achieved their goals if they addressed land taxation in a 
formal, planned way. Yet in being so inundated with ideas of being free from the 
monarchy, the French let themselves revert to the same conditions under which they 
had suffered before.  
 Fitzgerald goes on to explain the similar faults in the Russian Revolution. 
Here, too, revolutionaries wished to depart from economic inequality and severe 
mistreatment by the government. The spread of communism was thought to be a 
cure for these problems, but the eventual leadership of Joseph Stalin only resulted in 
“massive assassinations and failed economic plans cost[ing] something like thirty 
million lives.”4 In the cases of both France and Russia, the goals of their respective 
revolutions were never achieved; rather, each country ended up in a condition 
similar to, or worse than, how they began. 
 In Do Revolutions Create Good Governments? Eli Rosenberg seconds 
Fitzgerald’s sentiments. Revolutions, “don’t always lead to favorable…outcomes,” 
writes; “In fact, there’s a long and varied history of revolutions in the world producing 
leaders equally if not more repressive than those they deposed.” 5  Rosenberg 
references several failed revolutions, including that of Fidel Castro’s Cuba and Mao 
Zedong’s China. Both regimes began as communist revolutions and resulted in 
severe human rights abuses. In the former case, Castro imprisoned political 
opponents and censored the Cuban media. In the latter, Zedong established a 
method of land reform that consisted of beating wealthier peasants to death and 
giving their land to the less wealthy. Through this, the squashing of rebellions, 
creation of labor camps, famine, and other methods, Zedong is thought to have killed 
more people than Adolf Hitler. Indeed, according to researchers at Princeton 
University, Zedong is believed to have caused between forty and eighty million 
deaths.6 Both Castro and Zedong, however, began their rule as revolutionaries with 
promises of ending inequality. In both cases, the institutions put in place and run by 
these individuals, including but not limited to the secret police and the military, 
caused more harm than good to their respective nations. 
 In an interview with National Public Radio in February of 2011, Simon 
Schauma of Columbia University affirms the idea put forth that revolutions pose the 
risk of failing and leaving a nation in worse condition than before. He states, “If you 
don’t redirect and harness all that popular energy strategically against the institutions 
of power, you end up, actually, sitting in your own prison…you become a kind of 
museum of failed revolutionary energy.”7 Schauma confirms the idea put forth by 
                                               
4 Ibid. 
5 Eli Rosenberg, “Do Revolutions Create Good Governments?” The Atlantic, January 28, 2011. 
6 Valerie Strauss, “How Many Died?” Washington Post, July 17, 1994. 
7 Neal Conan, “The Elements of a Successful Revolution,” NPR, February 07, 2011. 
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Fitzgerald and Rosenberg: a successful revolution requires meticulous planning. If 
this effort is not exerted, it is clear that revolutionaries run the risk of not only failing 
to affect the desired change, but also the risk of permanently damaging the nation 
they vowed to fix.  
 In the Libyan Revolution of the Arab Spring, revolutionaries potentially 
damaged the country beyond repair after their killing of then-President Muammar 
Gaddafi. Though transitional programs did exist in the immediate aftermath, 
revolutionaries were not prepared to deal with the rebuilding of a torn-apart nation. 
In A Critical Analysis of the Security Crisis in a Post-Gaddafi Libya, Olajide Akanji 
states, “The failure to develop a coherent post-war peace-building and reconstruction 
agenda has undermined the political process, and the peace, stability and 
development of the country.”8 In the case of Libya, the revolution seemed successful 
because a dictator was eliminated and a transitional government was put into place. 
However, the revolutionaries’ failure to recognize the necessity of rebuilding a 
peaceful Libya after a civil war has caused the future of Libya to be less than ideal. 
 In the cases of post-conflict Cuba, China, and Libya, democracy struggles to 
survive in nations built on the oppression of their people. Some countries like these 
claim to have implemented democratic procedures, but the truth is often otherwise. 
As a result, democratic nations must find a way to measure whether democracy is 
truly being implemented. In The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century, Samuel Huntington states that he supports what he calls a two-turnover test, 
meaning that a country must have had two peaceful transitions of power to be 
considered a true democracy.9 While transitions are different from revolutions, their 
success in a revolutionary country can help measure whether a revolution in the 
name of democracy was successful. If there has been a revolution for democracy in 
any given country, according to Huntington, that revolution would be successful if 
the country subsequently passes the two-turnover test. If the country fails to pass this 
test, the revolution failed to instate a democratic process. Tunisia is the only nation 
that faced protests during the Arab Spring to have passed this test.  
 
Islamism 
In analyzing countries that have passed this two-turnover test, Huntington questions 
whether democracy can exist in non-Western cultures, stating that democracy has 
its base in the West and that it is relatively new to other cultures. In understanding 
Huntington’s position on culture having a role in whether democracy can take root 
                                               
8 Olajide Akanji, “A Critical Analysis of the Security Crisis in a Post-Gaddafi Libya,” Africa Insight 
(2015): 2. 
9 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
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anywhere, one must also understand the Western-culture thesis put forth by George 
Kennan: “Democracy, in short, is appropriate only for northwestern and perhaps 
central European countries and their settler-colony offshoots.”10 In defending this 
thesis, Huntington puts forth that certain cultures are hostile to democracy, with the 
most notable being Islamic. He tells that, though principles in Islam like 
egalitarianism and individualism are congruent with democracy, Islam: “rejects any 
distinction between the religious community and the political 
community…Fundamentalism Islam demands that…[Islamic scholars] have a 
‘decisive vote in articulating…all governmental policy.’”11 According to Huntington, 
Islam’s demand of precedence directly contradicts the rules of democracy. It is for 
this reason that so many Muslim countries have had issues forming and keeping a 
democracy. This does not, however, mean that revolutions and democracy cannot 
work in any majority Muslim nation. Rather, it means that a country determined to 
form a democracy must give up any theocratic elements. Citizens of a democratic 
nation can follow whatever religion they wish, but the government and law cannot 
be inherently religious. 
  In understanding the difficulty in merging Western life, democracy, and Islam 
in today’s society, many are attempting to form boundaries between Islam as a 
religion and Islam as an ideology. Islam as an ideology would refer to its political 
uses, as well as its current use in terrorism. In Islamism: Contested Perspectives on 
Political Islam, writers Abbas Barzegar and Richard Martin put forth that the terms 
“Islam” and “Islamism” should be used to describe different ideas. While Islam 
would describe the religion, Islamism would be “defined broadly to include, without 
being limited to, the possible use of force,” Donald Emmerson argues.12 The writers 
are attempting to portray Islam and extremist Islam as two different things, one being 
a religion and the other being an ideology. In doing so, they are contradicting 
Huntington’s view that Islam and democracy cannot coexist. Here, two different 
Islamic schools of thought are brought into consideration, with one being accepting 
of democracy and the other not. This is because Islam itself has no objection to 
democracy. However, when Islam is made political, extremist leaders often use fear 
to force a population into following a politically motivated agenda. This idea is 
present in places like Saudi Arabia, where the presence of a theocracy and religious 
police force allow for the government to oppress women through forced veiling and 
the need to be accompanied.   
                                               
10 Ibid, 23. 
11 Ibid., 28.  
12 Donald K. Emmerson, “Inclusive Islamism: The Utility of Diversity,” Abbas Barzegar, Islamism: 
Contested Perspectives on Political Islam (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 26. 
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 Though Huntington does put forth that it seems as if Islam and democracy 
cannot function together, he does reference countries that were almost successful at 
allowing the two to coexist, like Turkey and Lebanon. These nations, through 
attempts to limit the involvement of religion in government, were close to having 
both Islam and democracy present. Despite this, democracy in both countries 
eventually gave way to military coups or the rise of extremist organizations. Through 
these examples, when compared to unsuccessfully democratic nations like Pakistan, 
it is clear that certain levels of Islam are more compatible with democracy than 
others. Those present in Turkey and Lebanon, for example, have a better chance of 
creating a hospitable environment for democracy than those existing in Pakistan. In 
understanding what creates these different schools of Islamic thought, it is necessary 
to examine the prominence of Islam in the political system. 
 In understanding Islam’s power in any given country, one must examine the 
different types of Islamic movements. The World Almanac of Islamism describes three 
different kinds of Islamic political movements: moderate movements, Salafi 
movements, and militant jihadism.13  The first refers to movements with Islamic 
values that can blend in with a democratic society, while the second refers to 
movements that have the goal of forming a Caliphate, but only through education 
and nonviolence. While the first has room for the Western world, the second hopes 
to change the Western world or find a place in which Muslims can practice without 
the influence of the West. Militant jihadism, the extreme form, however, 
recommends the use of force to spread the message of Islam. These groups detest the 
existence of the Western world and often exist in the form of terrorist organizations 
like Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. Different types of Islamism and Islamic political 
movements allow for varying levels of acceptance of democracy and revolutionary 
ideals and, thus, have an effect on whether or not phenomena like the Arab Spring 
would be successful.  
 
Role of the Military 
In addition to institutions and religion, it is important to understand the role of the 
military when assessing the success of a revolution. Because many revolutions are 
stopped by force from the government, the military often has a large role in the 
outcome of revolutionary protest. In an interview with National Public Radio in 
February 2011, Neal Conan stated, “The idea that we in the United States have, that 
the purposes of armies are to fight and win wars, is not necessarily true in much of 
the world, where the purposes of armies are to keep the regime in power.”14 The idea 
                                               
13 American Foreign Policy Council, The World Almanac of Islamism (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). 
14 Conan. 
6





of the military in developing countries having much more power over citizens has a 
tremendous effect on the outcome of a revolution because when a dictator has an 
entire army on his side, he likely has access to more weapons and more people than 
revolutionaries do.  
 In The Role of Armed Forces in the Arab Uprisings, Derek Lutterbeck explains 
that nearly all Arab countries have military-based regimes. He goes on to say, 
however, that the role of each of these militaries varies significantly from one country 
to the next. The fact that most militaries are automatically on the side of the regime 
immediately makes any attempt at a revolution that much more difficult because, if 
need be, revolutionaries must now create an army large enough and skilled enough 
to fight a trained one. Lutterbeck writes, “While all Arab regimes facing challenges 
from pro-democracy movements have called upon their militaries to confront these 
popular uprisings, the armed forces have responded quite differently across the 
region, ranging from openness to, and even support for, protest movements to 
internal fracturing or firm support for the regime in power.”15 The importance of the 
military’s position is crucial, as the military can often end an uprising in minutes if it 
is on the side of the government. On the other hand, if the military sides with the 
protesters, they can become seemingly invincible.  
 The importance of the military in revolutions is not unique to the Arab Spring. 
In The French Revolution and the Role of Napoleon Bonaparte, writer Haroun Alfarsi 
states that the revolution began as a coup d’état. 16  The military’s decision to 
overthrow the government had much to do with the revolution actually taking 
leaders out of power. Had Napoleon not been commander in the army, he would 
likely not have had the power to truly cause change in France. His access to the 
military allowed for him to direct the revolution in any way he wished. The same 
success of ousting a leader using the military can be said of the Russian Revolution. 
On their own, citizens would not have had the power or the numbers to overthrow 
an entire regime and its army. Once a leader loses armed support, he or she often 
begins to lose the fight against revolutionaries as a whole. In analyzing the role of 
military forces in the Arab Spring, it will become clear that how the military was 
involved played a large role in whether the revolution turned into a massacre or a 
success story.  
 
                                               
15 Derek Lutterbeck, “The Role of Armed Forces in the Arab Uprisings,” Arab Uprisings and Armed 
Forces: Between Openness and Resistance, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (2011), 5. 
16 Haroun Alfarsi, “The French Revolution and the Role of Napoleon Bonaparte,” Version Daily, 
August 06, 2016; accessed March 1, 2018, http://www.versiondaily.com/french-revolution-and-the-
role-of-napoleon-bonaparte/ 
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Tunisia. Tunisia achieved independence from France in 1956 and was declared a 
republic and succumbed to a military coup over thirty years later. Following the 
constitution, this coup made prime minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali the president of 
the nation. Ben Ali’s Tunisia was characterized by high unemployment, severe 
corruption, and repression of protests against the president. On December 17, 2010, 
a twenty-six-year old street vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, lit himself on fire in protest 
of the corrupt government. When his fruit cart was confiscated by a female municipal 
officer, which had happened in the past, Bouazizi was unable to pay a bribe to keep 
the cart. Fuming, he went to the governor’s office demanding his scales back and, 
when denied entrance, poured gasoline over himself and questioned, “How do you 
expect me to make a living?”17 Bouazizi then dropped a match on himself, effectively 
starting a revolution. 
 Though Mohammed Bouazizi would not die until January 4, 2011, civil 
protests against the Ben Ali regime began shortly after the self-immolation. This 
reaction was not only in response to the suicide of the young vendor; it is widely 
perceived as a delayed reaction to WikiLeaks’ publishing of several confidential 
documents depicting corruption and repression of citizens by Ben Ali’s regime. The 
release’s summary states, “The economic impact is clear, with Tunisian investors—
fearing the long-arm of ‘the [Ben Ali] Family’—forgoing new investments, keeping 
domestic investment rates low and unemployment high.”18 It continues, “Seemingly 
half of the Tunisian business community can claim a Ben Ali connection through 
marriage, and many of these relations are reported to have made the most of their 
lineage.”19 The Tunisian government soon blocked this release, as its citizens were 
always subjected to harsh censorship. However, the leak’s impact remained known 
worldwide, as well as by many Tunisian citizens, and was published in European, 
American, and Arab newspapers. The summary concludes with, “The lack of 
transparency and accountability that characterize Tunisia’s political system similarly 
plague the economy, damaging the investment climate and fueling a culture of 
corruption.”20 When Mohammed Bouazizi lit himself on fire, it was in response to 
both unemployment in the region and government corruption. Combined with the 
revelation of corruption in the country, the death of the young man was able to ignite 
a reaction in many Tunisian people.  
                                               
17 Rania Abouzeid, “Mohammed Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia On Fire,” Time. 
January 21, 2011.  









 In the month following Bouazizi’s death, protests over inflation, 
unemployment, and corruption spread throughout the nation. Nineteen percent of 
the Tunisian workforce was unemployed in 2011.21 While some protests remained 
peaceful, all were met with attempts to break up the groups. On January 14, 2011, 
as protests continued, Ben Ali dissolved his government and declared a state of 
emergency. He later fled the country, ultimately arriving in Saudi Arabia. 
Parliamentary speaker Fouad Mebazaa was found to be the heir to the presidency 
and was given sixty days to organize elections. Even after the transition of power, 
protests continued, calling for the banning of Ben Ali’s political party and the ousting 
of the transitional government put into place by his successors. The government 
eventually gave into these demands and, in October 2011, free elections were held 
in Tunisia. Former dissident and well-regarded human rights activist Moncef 
Marzouki being elected to the presidency marked the end of Ben Ali’s hold on the 
nation. Today, Tunisia passes the “two-turnover test” for fledgling democracies put 
forth by Huntington, meaning that the country can be seen as a consolidated 
democracy due to its having had two peaceful transitions of power. The nation 
passed this test in October of 2014. Today, Tunisia is widely recognized as the only 
functioning Islamic democracy in the Middle East, as well as the only success of the 
Arab Spring.   
 In understanding that many revolutions of the Arab Spring resulted in dismal 
failures, Tunisia’s success is very often questioned. In analyzing the revolutions in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, however, it is very clear that the roles of governmental 
institutions, Islamism, and the military are directly responsible for the countries’ 
respective successes and failures. In the case of Tunisia, the government stepped 
down when it saw extreme uprisings. While its labor union worked to help both 
sides, its Islamist parties remain far from fundamentalist, and its military took a noble 
approach to the demonstrations. It is for these reasons that Tunisia remains the only 
success of the Arab Spring. 
 
Egypt. The Egyptian revolution began on January 25, 2011. Protestors took to the 
streets to protest the rule of president Hosni Mubarak, demanding that he be taken 
out of power. Protestors from all walks of life all over Egypt were protesting the 
economic turmoil and lack of political freedoms in the country. This culminated in 
the form of demonstrations, marches, strikes, civil disobedience, and occupations. 
Youth groups online organized many of these events, which quickly drew thousands 
of attendees.  
                                               
21 Trading Economics, “Tunisian Unemployment Rate 2005-2018,” 
https://tradingeconomics.com/tunisia/unemployment-rate 
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 The rule of Mubarak began in 1981, when his predecessor was assassinated. 
His party maintained a one-party rule by implementing a continual state of 
emergency. Law under this state of emergency extended police powers, limits non-
governmental activity, suspends constitutional rights, and permits several other 
human rights violations. Despite criticism, Mubarak asserted that this state of 
emergency was necessary to keep groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, which he 
labeled a terrorist group, suppressed. By warning against terrorism, Mubarak 
successfully prevented parliamentary elections from taking place, thus making any 
rule change nearly impossible. Had Mubarak stayed in power, his son would have 
inherited his rule.  
Police brutality, including torture, was commonplace in Egypt. In the name 
of preventing terrorism, many activists were wrongfully imprisoned and left without 
the right to object to such imprisonment. In addition to the violation of rights and 
wrongful continuation of power, Egypt was plagued with widespread corruption 
throughout the rule of Mubarak. Many powerful businessmen were appointed to 
powerful government positions in exchange for their support. In late 2010, nearly 
forty percent of Egyptians lived on less than two United States dollars per day.22 
Unemployment in the nation was rampant, and most Egyptians felt failed by the 
government. 
 Following a call to action on social media, thousands of people arrived in 
major cities across Egypt on January 25, 2011. This continued for weeks while 
Mubarak maintained his position that he would not resign. Military presence in many 
cities was increased, while curfews were imposed and ignored. On February 10th, 
2011, Mubarak announced that he would delegate some of his powers to his vice 
president, asserting that he would remain the head of state. The next day, the vice 
president announced Mubarak’s resignation, leaving the rule of the country in the 
hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Elections were eventually held, 
with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi being named president.  
 Within a year of Mohamed Morsi’s inauguration, protests against him began 
as well, due to his extremist Islamic views and his wish to usurp all power. He 
attempted to pass legislation that would allow him unlimited powers. Protests 
continued until his overthrow in 2013. Reeling from many issues, Egypt today 
remains unstable. Whether or not any of the actual goals of the revolution have been 
met is debatable. Fareed Zakaria states, “I recently asked a secular, liberal Egyptian 
from Cairo…whether the current regime feels like a return of the old order. ‘Oh no,’ 
                                               
22 Gokhan Akcesme, “Economic Motives Behind the 2011 Egyptian Revolution,” Calhoun: The NPS 
Institutional Archive (2014). 
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he said, ‘This one is far more brutal, repressive, and cynical than Mubarak’s.’”23 
Despite the removal of both Mubarak and Morsi, Egypt is still not stable. It is, 
however, not the most horrific example of a revolution in the Arab Spring.  
 Egypt’s institutions and Islamism allowed the revolution to fail. A rich network 
of mosques and corrupt businessmen in Egypt allowed for extremist parties to have 
the resources necessary to broadcast views to the everyday Egyptian. Despite having 
an authoritarian taken out of power, Egyptians were unable to move forward simply 
because an Islamist extremist party stepped into rule easily. The sense of Islamism in 
Egypt portrayed through the Muslim Brotherhood is extremist and came to power by 
exploiting the views of everyday, non-extremist Egyptians. Despite the failure of the 
revolution, however, Egypt does not represent the most horrific aftermath of the Arab 
Spring in the way that countries like Syria, Yemen, and Libya do. This is mainly due 
to the military’s role in the revolution. In Egypt, the military took the side of the 
protestors, thus saving the nation from thousands of civilian deaths.  
 
Syria. Protests began in Damascus, Syria on March 15, 2011 over demands for 
democracy and the release of political prisoners. Along with inspiration from other 
Arab Spring protests, this followed the arrest of a thirteen-year-old boy for drawing 
anti-governmental graffiti.24 The Syrian government responded to these protests by 
firing into crowds. For months, protests continued with the government continuing 
to inflict violence on its own people. In July, several defected military officers 
announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army, an opposition force with the goal 
of taking al-Assad out of power.  
 Despite attempts by the United Nations to facilitate peace in Syria, conflict 
continued to the level of a full-fledged civil war. Islamist groups, like the Islamic 
State, soon entered the conflict with the hopes of gaining territory and power. The 
hold of important areas like the Shaar oil field by Islamist groups led to more and 
more conflict. As the civil war intensified, other world powers began to contribute 
to the war. Many Western countries, after knowledge of Assad’s use of chemical 
weapons spread through the United Nations, took the side of rebel groups. Russia 
and Iran, on the other hand, backed al-Assad. With so many well-equipped world 
powers on either side of the conflict, violence increased.  
 At the end of 2017, the Islamic State in Syria was said to have been defeated 
by Syrian, Russian, and American forces. Despite this, the conflict in Syria continues 
to escalate. On April 7, 2018, a chemical attack was carried out on the city of 
                                               
23 Fareed Zakaria, “Why Democracy Took Root in Tunisia and Not Egypt,” Washington Post, 
October 20, 2014. 
24 Kareem Fahim, “A Faceless Teenage Refugee Who Helped Ignite Syria’s War,” New York Times, 
February 8, 2013. 
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Douma, killing seventy people and injuring at least five hundred. The Syrian 
government denied any involvement in this attack. The United Nations Security 
Council, due to opposing views from Russia and the United States, could not adopt 
any resolution regarding inquiry into the attack. Following this, the United States, 
United Kingdom, and France carried out airstrikes against Syrian government targets, 
mostly thought to be bases for chemical weapons.  
 The protests in Syria began peacefully with citizens demanding democracy 
and the release of political prisoners. As the government continued to fight with the 
protestors, however, these demands eventually changed to the calling for al-Assad 
to step down. The president refused to do so, forcing the conflict to escalate. Today, 
many groups are involved in Syria’s civil war, which has created an international 
refugee crisis. The oppressive governmental institutions of Syria, the presence of 
extremist Islamic groups, and the role of the military in crushing civilian uprisings 
ensured that the Syrian revolution would not be successful. Rather, these factors 
forced Syria into a full-fledged civil war.  
 
Institutions  
Tunisia. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ruled Tunisia while embracing all of the 
power and luxuries that come with corruption. He attempted to suppress protests, 
and did so successfully, for many years. The leader wished to continue with this 
process throughout the 2010-2011 protests, even implying so in a television address 
on December 28, 2011, in which he put forth that the protests were unacceptable 
and would be met with the utmost “firmness of the law.”25 Ben Ali wished to crush 
any opponents and, when it appeared that he could not do so, he tried to discredit 
them.  
Though the leader did denounce the motives of many protestors by deeming 
them violent, the president did seemingly attempt, or put forth the image that he was 
attempting, to understand the demands of those uprising. In an attempt to quell the 
unrest, Ben Ali visited Mohammed Bouazizi in the hospital in late December. The 
very next day, he removed his communications secretary to replace him with the 
minister for youth and sport. In the following weeks, the distraught leader promised 
the creation of 300,000 jobs and an emergency program to “Create jobs and provide 
‘means of subsistence’ for youths that have been out of work for long periods.”26 
Though many accuse Ben Ali’s promises as a mere façade, his outward willingness 
to recognize the problems causing the protests was significantly helpful in Tunisia’s 
eventual recognition and solution-building for said problems. This recognition gave 
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credit to the protesters and the issues that they wished to address, while also 
acknowledging the government’s role in solving these problems.  
The rule of Ben Ali and his party was characterized as being completely 
corrupted. For this reason, it was not likely that the country could evolve with this 
ruler or his party in power. The timing of Ben Ali’s decision to step down allowed 
Tunisia to have time to rebuild without massive atrocities. With protests beginning 
on December 18, 2010 and the president resigning on January 14, 2011, the 
revolution lasted a total of three weeks and six days. Ben Ali’s resignation, though it 
may have been in vain, ensured that the Tunisian protestors were not simply violently 
crushed; they received the result that they wanted without facing mass extermination 
like the protestors in Syria were forced to endure.  
Following Ben Ali’s ousting, prime minister Mohamed Ghannouchi was 
briefly president. Courts then decided that parliamentary speaker Fouad Mebazaa 
was the rightful heir of the position. Both men attempted to establish a transitional 
government. Protests, however, did not stop, as the Tunisian people wished to have 
a government free from Ben Ali’s party. Under the Tunisian Constitution, Mebazaa 
was given sixty days to put elections together. With the election of former dissident 
Moncef Marzouki months later, the reign of Ben Ali’s party came to an end.  
Governmental forces in Tunisia, particularly those related to Ben Ali, were 
known as corrupt and oppressive. Despite these traits being prevalent throughout the 
Arab World, Tunisia remains the only country to successfully escape from these 
forces and enter democracy. This is because these corrupt leaders, while they briefly 
did attempt to suppress the rebellion, eventually gave in to the demands of the 
Tunisian people. Ben Ali saw no way to control his country and left, while Mebazaa 
simply respected the rules put forth in his constitution. The mild nature of these 
dictatorial institutions allowed for Tunisia to embrace the revolution and its 
aftermath.  
In addition to somewhat moderate authoritative governments, Tunisians in the 
time of the revolution had the privilege of having a national trade union center as 
powerful as the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT). The trade union became part 
of the National Dialogue Quartet, a group made up of UGTT, The Tunisian Human 
Rights League, the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts, and 
the Tunisian Order of Lawyers. Together, these groups worked to address the national 
discord that followed the revolution.27 According to Stanford historian Joel Beinin, 
the UGTT is “the single most important reason that Tunisia is a democracy today.”28 
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The importance of trade unions in Tunisia can be traced back to the 1920s, which is 
to thank for Tunisia’s robust civil society, another factor to which the nation’s success 
can be attributed.29 With well over half a million members dispersed throughout the 
country, UGTT has power and influence over many Tunisian people. With its 
original goals having to do with employment and the uprising’s cry out for job 
opportunities, it is not surprising that the trade union was involved in the revolution. 
Mohamed-Salah Omri states, “The fit between the revolution and UGTT was almost 
natural since the main demands of the rising masses, namely jobs, national dignity, 
and freedom had been on the agenda of the union all along.”30  
The presence of UGTT helped facilitate the revolution through its being a 
common factor among Tunisians from different areas of the country. Large protests 
were held in front of UGTT centers. At these centers, protesters were able to articulate 
their demands and do so peacefully and with credibility. Without UGTT, it is very 
likely that the movements following Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation would 
have never spread as quickly and effectively as they did.  
While the trade union was helpful to the revolution itself, it was particularly 
useful as a mediator in post-revolution disputes. Most politicians trusted UGTT to 
have such a job and also respected its ability to voice its opinion while doing so. 
Omri writes, “UGTT’s role was crucial in the framing debate, steering decision-
making in the chaotic period, starting the Council for the Protection of the 
Revolution, and serving as a meeting place of all the parties at a time when parties 
were either small, insignificant politically, or formed recently.” 31  Following the 
mediations, the civil society made up of members of UGTT worked to piece the 
country back together. When Ben Ali left a power vacuum in Tunisia, the trade union 
was able to step in and turn a chaotic revolution into a democratic transition. Without 
the role of UGTT in the revolution, the rebel cause would have had trouble both 
articulating itself and reaching different areas, while new parties would have 
struggled to make themselves known. This could have left a void to be filled with 
extremists were it not for the civil society that took hold of the nation. Without the 
UGTT, Tunisia may have never ended up being the only success of the Arab Spring.  
 
                                               
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/uprising1313/safwan-masri-workers-and-soldiers-the-role-of-
institutions-in-tunisias-and-egypts-revolutions/ 
29 Ibid.  
30 Mohamed-Salah Omri, “No Ordinary Trade Union: The Role of UGTT in the Tunisian Path to 
Revolution and Transition,” 
http://www.academia.edu/19291239/No_Ordinary_Union_The_role_of_UGTT_in_the_Tunisian_pat
h_to_revolution_and_transition 
31 Ibid., 23.  
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Egypt. While Tunisia could thank its major trade union and the civil society formed 
by it for help throughout the revolution, Egypt could not do the same. Economic 
grievances and workers’ demands played just as important a role in Egypt’s 
revolution as they did in Tunisia, but workers in Egypt were not given a network in 
which to voice their concerns. The Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) had 
previously been rendered “politically impotent” by the Mubarak regime and, thus, 
had only supported one strike through decades of protest.32 Both before and during 
the revolution, Egyptians saw the union as corrupt and as a symbol of the regime. 
The union was seen as a tool for corrupt political control. For this reason, ETUF had 
no place in the demand for democracy and equality.  
 While protestors in Egypt were being worked against by their very own trade 
unions, they were also being targeted by the State Security Investigations Service 
(SSIS), an internal security agency. Prior to and throughout the revolution, the agency 
was protested against for their role in the torture, kidnapping, and murder of anyone 
that questioned the government. At one point, protestors broke into the SSIS 
headquarters and attempted to steal documents with information that they believed 
to contain evidence of the crimes committed by the agency. 33  As protestors 
continued to defy the agency, they also continued to disappear. By March 2011, the 
SSIS was blamed for over 1,200 disappearances.34 The role of the SSIS did prevent 
the Egyptian Revolution from being very successful, as it ensured that many 
protestors of the regime would disappear, creating fear among all Egyptian people.  
 
Syria. When protests became too much for the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents to 
handle, they chose to step down. This did not, however, occur in Syria. Bashar al-
Assad, despite calls for him to resign from his own people and from several other 
world powers, remains the president of Syria. This is representative of the corruption, 
addiction to power, and overall pride not only of the president, but in Syria’s political 
institutions as a whole. The failure of Syria’s political institutions to enforce 
accountability and protect the people of Syria is a major cause of the escalated 
situation currently happening there.  
 Freedom House rates Syria’s electoral process as zero out of twelve, meaning 
that there is no legitimacy to the process electing officials to power.35 Despite the 
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ongoing civil war, elections were held in Syria in 2012, with Assad having an 
opponent for the first time. Syria claimed having nearly seventy-five percent voter 
turnout, with the president receiving nearly ninety-percent of the votes.36 Much of 
the Western world viewed this election as a farce, considering more than a fifth of 
the voting population is thought to have been displaced due to the civil war.  
There are several other governmental institutions, other than electoral 
processes, that lack accountability, fairness, and transparency. This is especially true 
of the police force and prison systems of Syria. Even before the armed conflict began 
in 2011, any person attempting to question the legitimacy of the government could 
face imprisonment or death.37 A main reason for the initial protests was the people’s 
demand for the release of political prisoners. Many resolved to take to the streets 
after the arrest of a young boy for drawing anti-government graffiti.  
Syria’s electoral processes and other governmental institutions were created 
in a way that allowed the government to amass and abuse power with little to no 
consequence. If Syria had more effective political institutions put in place, like 
regulated free and fair elections, corruption like that of al-Assad would not have been 
spread so easily with no accountability. The lack of balance in the Syrian government 
allowed for a dictatorship to take hold.  
The institution of sect in Syria has also contributed to conflict in the nation, 
almost ensuring clashes. The religion of Islam has two main sects: Sunni and Shia. 
Followers of each type disagree over the caliph that is said to be the successor of 
Prophet Muhammad.38 Though this conflict has existed for centuries, it remains the 
cause of many violent clashes, including attacks by Sunni Islamist groups like the 
Islamic State on Shia Muslims. Alawites are considered a sect within the Shia sect.  
Conflict between the Syrian population and the government over religion 
began in 1973, when Bashar al-Assad’s father and predecessor, an Alawite, put forth 
in a new constitution that the president of Syria does not necessarily have to be a 
Muslim.39 This caused nationwide outrage, but especially infuriated Sunni terrorist 
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite a series of armed revolts, the 
government survived. Today, al-Assad, also an Alawite, claims that his government 
is secular but takes a firm stance against Sunni Muslims, due to factions like the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Sunni Muslims make up nearly three-quarters of Syria’s 
population, making Assad’s favoritism for other sects incredibly ostracizing for a very 
large percentage of the population. Despite Alawites making up less than ten percent 
of Syria’s population, Assad’s supposedly secular government has favored them. This 
                                               
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 John Harney. “How Do Sunni and Shia Islam Differ?” The New York Times, January 3, 2016.  
39 Ibid. 
16





minority was once ostracized by Sunni Muslims, making the majority of the 
population incredibly frustrated by Assad’s preferential treatment, which includes the 
appointment of Assad-supporting Alawites to military officer and other governmental 
positions.40 The anger and disenfranchisement of Sunni Muslims over the minority-
ruled government has led many to attempt to overthrow the government through 
rebel forces, including extremist groups like the Islamic State. This sectarian conflict 
has greatly contributed to the start of the Syrian Civil War. It has also led to Shia 
countries like Iran being involved on the side of the government. The institution of 
sect in Syria has not only ensured conflict; it has allowed for many different factions 
to become involved in the war.  
 
Islamism  
Tunisia. In Tunisia, as it is with much of the Arab world, Islam is a deciding factor 
when it comes to laws, the government, and human rights. People often blame the 
theocratic nature of Saudi Arabia’s government for its frequent human rights 
violations. It is not surprising that Islam is a topic of conversation when questioning 
why Tunisia remains a moderate success. According to Fareed Zakaria, the question 
of why Tunisia succeeded while Egypt failed is a simple one. He states, “The most 
common [answer] is that Tunisia’s Islamists were just better than Egypt’s.”41  
 The main Islamist political party in Tunisia is Ennahda, a movement originally 
inspired by the Iranian Revolution and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Zakaria 
goes on to tell why Ennahda is one of the most modern Islamist parties in the world, 
stating, “Ennahda has not tried to institute sharia, has declared its respect for Tunisia’s 
progressive laws on women’s rights, and voluntarily ceded power this year to a 
technocratic, national unity government when faced with popular protests.”42 The 
willingness of this political party to participate in democracy has made it much 
different than its Egyptian counterpart, as Ennahda is a political party that can 
function in a human rights-conscious democracy, while the Muslim Brotherhood is 
unable to do so. 
Though Ennahda has existed since 1981, its modern connotation refers to its 
involvement in the 2011 revolution. In the wake of the revolution, leaders of the 
party were seen attempting to find a place in the new country by meeting with prime 
ministers and taking part in demonstrations. At this time, the party urged Tunisians 
that it did not intend on making Tunisia a theocracy. Rather, it wanted to join in its 
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new democracy. In addressing the fears of many Tunisians, spokesman Samir Dilou 
stated: “Our party is not a religious party. We are a modern party against the 
background of an Islamic worldview…We do not want a theocracy. We want a 
democratic state shaped by the idea of freedom, and people should decide for 
themselves how to live.”43 From the beginning of Ennahda’s involvement in the 
aftermath of the Tunisian revolution, it declared itself less authoritarian than any 
other Islamist party in the Arab world. Because of this, it was able to acquire support 
among many Tunisians who had rebelled in the name of seeking a free and fair 
government.  
 Many authoritarian Islamist parties will often make promises of democracy 
and then abandon those ideas when they come to power. Ennahda was elected due 
to its platform, but did not let go of its principles after this. When the government run 
by Ennahda officials was criticized due to poor economic performance and lack of 
control among fundamental Islamist groups, it agreed to step down in favor of a 
technocratic government that would help to facilitate free and fair elections, as well 
as draft a new constitution. Ennahda’s willingness to step aside was unprecedented 
for Islamist parties in the Arab world, as much of them often refuse to do so and 
respond with violence. This commitment to democracy shows that the party is truly 
the most modern Islamist party to have any place in the Arab Spring. If the leaders of 
Ennahda did not possess the humility necessary to let the people dictate their own 
government, Tunisia could have faced yet another major conflict. 
 The commitment of Ennahda and its supporters to democratic principles was 
further demonstrated when the party did not put forward or endorse any candidate 
in the November 2014 presidential election. Because of this party’s willingness to 
accept defeat and, thus, its commitment to the people of Tunisia, the nation has 
successfully completed free and fair elections with the involvement of an Islamist 
party. In many nations in the Arab world, religious parties and fair elections simply 
cannot coexist due to the hunger for power possessed by most religious leaders. In 
the case of Ennahda, Tunisia was able to move past a potential major conflict thanks 
to the party’s willingness to do what was best for the country. 
 
Egypt. The rich network of mosques and Islamic associations in Egypt made it 
incredibly easy for parties like the Muslim Brotherhood to reach the everyday 
Egyptian through advertisements, demonstrations, and other means. In Counting 
Islam, Tarek Masoud states, “Islamists were able to defeat secular parties…because 
they could piggyback on the country’s rich Islamic…to reach everyday citizens. 
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Secular parties [couldn’t]…so they turned to the army.”44 Islamist propaganda in 
Egypt supported the election of an extremist authoritarian just after the ousting of 
another authoritarian. The lack of resources for secular parties left them 
disenfranchised and pushed these parties to overthrow their Islamic counterparts 
with the help of the military.  
Similar to the case of Tunisia, the Islamist party won the first election after the 
revolution. However, the Muslim Brotherhood was not comparable to Tunisia’s 
Ennahda. While the latter supported secularism, democracy, and the wishes of the 
Tunisian people, the former switched its views as soon as it came to power. President 
Morsi almost immediately became more authoritative than Mubarak had been. The 
Muslim Brotherhood had been looking to come into power for decades and was able 
to do so when Mubarak left a power vacuum in Egypt. The presence of political Islam 
in the nation doomed Egypt from the start, as this politically motivated, wide-
reaching organization was given nearly unlimited access to all resources necessary 
to run a campaign and become elected. Had more moderate parties, like Tunisia’s 
Ennahda, had the capabilities that their extremist counterparts possessed, it is likely 
that an extremist would have never been elected, thus leaving room for a moderate 
party like Ennahda.  
 
Syria. Islamism also had a large role in Syria’s unrest. Islamists remain on several 
sides of the conflict, including that of the Islamic State and the rebel groups. A Syrian 
faction of the Muslim Brotherhood has asserted itself in the fight against al-Assad.45 
Despite its claim to not have a very large amount of influence in the fight, the faction 
is said to have control of at least one quarter of the Free Syrian Army through its 
funding.46 This does allow for the Brotherhood to have a considerable amount of say 
in the actions of the militia. However, spokesmen for the group have said that they 
do not plan on undermining democracy, nor do they wish to play a large role in the 
future of Syrian government.47  
 On the other side of the spectrum remain Islamist groups like the Islamic State 
that hope to utilize a power vacuum left in Syria to institute an Islamic caliphate. The 
al-Nusra Front, a faction of Syrian rebels, has the same goal of creating a caliphate 
for Sunni Muslims. Together, The Islamic State and the al-Nusra Front have claimed 
hundreds of terrorist attacks. The involvement of these extremist groups has 
considerably added to the violence and death toll of Syria. The presence of these 
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groups has also led many world powers, like Russia, to support Bashar al-Assad 
despite his alleged human rights violations. This is because it is believed that if Assad 
is taken out of power, Islamist groups will take advantage of the situation to form a 
caliphate in Syria.  
 Islamism has added a great deal of influence to the situation in Syria. While 
some groups have used it merely politically, others have used it violently. If the 
diplomatic community is to address the situation in Syria, it will have to understand 
the ideological factors motivating several of the groups involved.  
 
The Role of the Military  
Tunisia. In many cases of revolution, the military plays an important role in the 
success or failure of the existing government. In most nations, the military is 
controlled entirely by the head of government and, thus, can often act against 
civilians when given orders to do so. In Tunisia, the military played a drastic role in 
the success of the Tunisian people, as it rejected orders to attack civilian protest and 
instead protected the revolution. Had the Tunisian military used force against 
protestors, it is likely that the revolution would have never progressed to the exile of 
the former president. 
 During and even before president Ben Ali, the military’s role was a modest 
one; it did not make political decisions and was even banned from joining the ruling 
political party. The military had never attempted a coup, something that is quite 
common in many North African countries, and mainly focused on border defense. 
According to Zoltan Barany in Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military: 
“Ben Ali’s Tunisia was a police state. As in many other sultanistic regimes, it was a 
place where the regular military found itself overshadowed by far larger, more amply 
funded, and more politically influential security agencies run by the Interior 
Ministry.”48 In order to keep the military generally happy, Ben Ali sent several of his 
military officers to the United States for training. There, many were exposed to the 
standards of civil-military relations in a democracy like the United States. By the time 
of the Arab Spring, the military had little to no stake in the government and, thus, 
had no reason to go against civilians in favor of the regime.  
The independence of the military was portrayed when protests against 
President Ben Ali became too much for the Presidential Guard and his gangs to 
handle, the leader ordered General Rachid Ammar, the army chief of staff, to deploy 
troops “in support of the regime’s security detachments.”49 General Ammar refused 
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this order and soon placed his troops in between governmental forces and protesting 
civilians, effectively saving the Tunisian revolution. The army’s refusing to fire upon 
protestors directly contributed to the success of the Tunisian revolution. Had the 
army taken the side of Ben Ali, it, along with the nation’s other security forces, would 
have violently crushed protestors and perhaps crushed the entire revolution. Without 
the support of the military, democracy in Tunisia would not have been possible.  
 
Egypt. In analyzing the role of institutions and Islamism in the Egyptian Revolution, 
it seems unclear why the country did not end up in as abysmal a situation as Syria. 
This idea, however, becomes clear when one looks at the role of the military 
throughout the revolution. Though the military did not explicitly side with protestors 
the way that of Tunisia did, it did not side with the regime either. The military did 
not play an active role in the beginning of the revolution. Rather, it opted out of firing 
at protesters and stopping them from filling Tahrir Square. However, when Mubarak 
unleashed extensive violence on protestors on February 2, the regime lost all 
credibility and soldiers quickly took the side of the protesters.  
 The siding of the military with the protesters can be blamed on several factors, 
including the extensive reliance by the regime on police forces and the fact that 
Egypt’s conscripted military was so involved with society that many soldiers would 
have likely refused to fire upon protesters.50 Similar to the Tunisian military, their 
Egyptian counterpart did not find itself incredibly loyal to the regime, nor did it find 
it just to fire on civilians. The refusal of the military to give in to the demands of 
Mubarak saved countless civilian lives. This, along with the allowing of protesters to 
enter prominent spaces like Tahrir Square, ensured that the protests and revolution 
would live on. Were it not for the military’s decision to not side with the regime, 
Mubarak could have easily squashed any uprising, ensuring that democracy would 
never come to Egypt. Despite the amicable nature of the military, however, the 
Egyptian Revolution still faced problems elsewhere and, thus, would not live to be 
as successful as its Tunisian counterpart.  
 
Syria. The military has played a considerably important role in the current situation 
of Syria. While the military in Tunisia and Egypt refused to fire upon protesters, that 
of Syria did and continues to inflict violence upon civilians. The Syrian military has 
acted as a police force for the president and has “cracked down on the popular 
uprising, without a splintering of the armed forces.”51 Rather than out of devotion to 
the president, many defectors of the Syrian military have cited fear as a reason that 
                                               
50 Barany. 
51 Lutterbeck, 45. 
21
Delmonico: The Role of Institutions, Islamism, and Militaries in the Outcomes of the Arab Spring




troops choose to obey orders and fire at civilians, stating “soldiers who refused to 
shoot protesters were themselves executed by their superiors.”52 Through the use of 
fear, the Syrian government has formed a grip on its military, ensuring that the trained 
group stays on the side of the president.  
 In addition to fear tactics, much of the military chooses to stay on the side of 
Assad because both he and the military are made up of Alawites, a sect of Shia 
Muslims.53 Most protesters, however, are Sunni Muslims. The tension between sects, 
no matter how miniscule, has been a contributing factor in the military’s decision to 
side with the government. The Syrian government’s position as a ruling minority 
ensures that leaders like Assad are fearful of losing power, for they understand that if 
they do lose power, they will be punished for their actions. This is reminiscent of 
point put forth by international relations theorist Reinhold Niebuhr that states that 
political life will constantly swing between tyranny and anarchy.54 According to this 
theory, those who come to power are so afraid of the anarchy that will follow a 
revolution that they must cling to power as long as they can. This has ensured that 
Assad and the minority military will fight the attempted revolution as hard as they 
can, or else face retribution.   
 In addition to the military’s role in dismantling a revolution in Syria, defectors 
of the Syrian military have also played a large part in ensuring that conflict continues 
to escalate. Defectors from the Syrian military founded the Free Syrian Army, one of 
the main rebel groups in the nation. The Free Syrian Army has made large 
contributions to the fights against both Islamist parties and the Syrian government. 
This force, however, may not have been founded if it were not for those who decided 
to leave the Syrian military and work against it.  
 The military’s decision to side with Bashar al-Assad and inflict violence upon 
protesters has, without a doubt, made the Syrian protests among the most deadly of 
the Arab Spring. If it were not for this decision, Assad may have stepped down in the 
same way the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt did. However, those who did defect 
from the military are the ones that continue to battle the Syrian regime over the rights 
of the Syrian people. The military, its decisions, and its defectors have all played an 
incredibly important role in leading Syria to its civil war.    
 
Conclusion 
Through the case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, it is apparent that the factors 
contributing to the success or failure of their respective revolutions boil down to three 
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elements: institutional disposition, the presence of Islamism, and the role of the 
military. Tunisia’s robust civil society, its moderate Islamists, and its depoliticized, 
autocratic military all helped to form the nation’s democracy as the only successful 
result of the Arab Spring. Egypt, however, was saved from catastrophe only by the 
military’s conscious decision to stand with protesters. In the case of Syria, however, 
institutional corruption, extremist Islamists, and an oppressive military with strong 
allegiance to the Assad regime have contributed to the nation becoming a war zone.  
 If the diplomatic community is to address the failing nature of states like Syria, 
it must not only understand why Syria failed; it must examine the factors that led 
countries like Tunisia to success. In understanding the factors resulting in the 
successes and failure of the Arab Spring, the international community can learn more 
about the causes, effects, and factors of the modern revolution. By understanding 
these factors, the diplomatic community can attempt to prevent situations like Syria 
from occurring again through international policy enforcement regarding oppressive 
governments and military systems. Similarly, when a revolution is taking place, the 
international community can attempt to facilitate actions like those that were taken 
in Tunisia, including the involvement of institutions like trade unions and the 
government’s acknowledgement of issues and willingness to listen.   
 Due to the failing nature of many countries in the Arab world following the 
Arab Spring, it is not likely that the fight for democracy in the Middle East is over. 
Protests, attempted revolutions, and oppressive government involvement are likely 
to occur again. With the knowledge of what causes successes like Tunisia and 
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